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ABSTRACT: The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 explicitly increased Medicare pay-
ments to private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans. As a result, every MA plan in the nation 
is paid more for its enrollees than they would have been expected to cost in traditional fee-
for-service Medicare. The authors calculate that payments to MA plans in 2008 will be 12.4 
percent greater than the corresponding costs in traditional Medicare—an average increase 
of $986 per MA plan enrollee, for a total of more than $8.5 billion. Over the five-year 
period 2004–2008, extra payments to MA plans are estimated to have totaled nearly $33 
billion. Although Congress recently enacted modest reductions in MA plan payments, 
these changes will not take effect until 2010. Moreover, while the new legislation removes 
a few factors contributing to the extra payments, a number of other factors remain unaffected.
                    
OvERviEw
The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) included a broad set of provi-
sions intended to expand the role of private health plans in Medicare. Included 
among these were new payment policies that increased payments to private 
health plans. 
The higher level of payments for Medicare Advantage (MA) plans—as 
these private plans are now called—was based on a belief that, following an 
upfront investment to stabilize plan participation and increase beneficiary enroll-
ment, “private plans and competition will help drive down the explosive growth 
of Medicare spending.”1 However, in each of the five years from 2004 through 
2008, MMA policies have resulted in payments to MA plans that have substan-
tially exceeded comparable costs in traditional fee-for-service Medicare. 
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The analysis in this paper uses the latest (2008) 
data on actual enrollment in MA plans and on MA 
benchmark payment rates to estimate the extra pay-
ments made to MA plans relative to what the same 
enrollees would have cost under traditional Medicare. 
Based on this information, we calculate that 
payments to MA plans in 2008 exceed local fee-for-
service costs by 12.4 percent, or an average of $986 
for each of the 8.7 million Medicare enrollees in 
managed care,2 for a national total of more than $8.5 
billion.3 Over the five-year period 2004–2008, extra 
payments to MA plans are estimated to have totaled 
nearly $33 billion.4 
In the recent Medicare Improvements for 
Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA), the 
Congress made modest reductions in payments to MA 
plans, which take effect in 2010. If these reductions 
had been in effect in 2008, MA plan payments still 
would have exceeded fee-for-service costs by 10.6 
percent. This paper focuses on payments in 2008, 
which were unaffected by the MIPPA legislation.
BACkgROund: MEdiCARE And  
PRivATE PlAnS
The participation of private health plans in Medicare is 
not new. Prepaid group practice plans, the early form 
of health maintenance organizations (HMOs), have 
been part of Medicare since its inception in 1966. 
Moreover, the first major set of Medicare amendments 
in 1972 created a program under which HMOs would 
receive prepayment for providing coordinated care to 
Medicare beneficiaries.
In 1982, the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act gave HMOs the opportunity to be 
paid on a risk basis, at 95 percent of average per capita 
fee-for-service costs, in each county. HMOs were 
expected to be more efficient than the traditional pro-
gram, saving the government 5 percent on expected 
costs for each enrollee while offering additional bene-
fits—in the form of lower out-of-pocket payments or 
benefits not covered by traditional Medicare.5 
During the 1990s, Medicare beneficiary enroll-
ment in these risk plans (called “Medicare+Choice” 
plans) grew rapidly—from 1.3 million to 5.2 million, 
or 3.7 percent of beneficiaries to 13.5 percent, between 
1990 and 1997.6 This rapid growth was fueled by the 
additional benefits that these plans were able to pro-
vide: in 1996, risk plans provided an average of $924 
per member annually in additional benefits.7 But the 
availability of these benefits was not uniform across 
the country, being highly correlated with the payment 
rate in each area. The 10 percent of risk plans with the 
highest payment rates (29 percent higher than the 
nationwide average, adjusted for local input costs) 
offered additional benefits worth an average of $1,452 
annually, while the 10 percent of plans with the lowest 
payment rates (25 percent below the nationwide aver-
age) offered extra benefits worth only $576 annually.8
Moreover, because Medicare risk plans—and 
therefore enrollment in those plans—tended to be con-
centrated in certain areas, so was the availability of 
additional benefits. In the era before prescription-drug 
coverage was available to all Medicare beneficiaries, 
this distribution caused particular concern. In effect, 
beneficiaries in some areas with relatively high pay-
ment rates and high risk-plan penetration had access to 
a prescription-drug benefit—funded by Medicare pay-
ments—while beneficiaries in other areas (including 
many rural areas) did not.
Elimination of this inequity was one objective 
of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA), which for 
the first time set Medicare payments to private plans in 
some areas at a higher level than average fee-for- 
service costs. It did this by establishing both a nation-
wide minimum payment rate, or floor, and a blended 
rate based on a combination of each area’s own aver-
age costs and the nationwide average. These provi-
sions benefited plans in rural and other relatively low-
cost areas. In 2001, the Medicare, Medicaid, and 
SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 
2000 expanded the policy of paying private plans more 
than average fee-for-service costs by setting a new 
higher floor for private plans in large urban areas.9 
Following the enactment of the BBA in 1997, 
the Congressional Budget Office predicted that 27 per-
cent of Medicare beneficiaries would be enrolled in 
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private plans by 2002.10 But after peaking in 1999 at 
16 percent of beneficiaries nationwide, Medicare 
Choice (M+C) plan enrollment declined to 12 percent 
in 2003 (Figure 1). This was largely due to the fact 
that, in addition to changing the way in which pay-
ment rates were determined, the BBA also reduced the 
overall increase in payments for fee-for-service 
Medicare and, consequently, to M+C plans. Results 
included the withdrawal of plans from many areas and 
a reduction in the benefits offered to private-plan 
enrollees. This decline helped spur creation of the 
Medicare Advantage program in 2003, which further 
increased MA payments and expanded the types of pri-
vate plans available for Medicare beneficiaries. 
MA PlAn PAyMEnTS in 2008
Medicare payments to MA plans in 2008 are based on 
four factors: (1) county benchmark rates specified by 
the MMA; (2) a budget-neutral risk-adjustment 
(BNRA) policy that increases the benchmarks by 1.7 
percent in 2008; (3) the inclusion of the fee-for-service 
payment adjustment for indirect medical education (IME) 
costs in the benchmark rates; and (4) a plan-bidding 
mechanism (described below) that reduces payments 
by an average of 4.3 percent in 2008. Taken together, 
these four policies result in extra payments to MA 
plans that average $986 per MA plan enrollee per year, 
for a national total of more than $8.5 billion in 2008.
County Benchmark Rates. For 2008, Medicare 
benchmark rates for MA plans in each county are set 
at the highest of seven different reference rates. The 
first four of these are based on payment levels established 
in March 2004, trended forward each year through 
2008; the other three are based on fee-for-service costs 
in a base year, trended forward to 2008. 
The seven types of county benchmark rates are:
A minimum rate (or floor) for large urban areas •	
(areas with populations of more than 250,000), 
which in 2008 is set at $9,499 per enrollee 
annually.
A minimum rate (or floor) for rural and smaller •	
urban areas, which in 2008 is set at $8,595 
annually.
A blended rate, which is a 50/50 combination of •	
the base Medicare Advantage rate for the 
county in 2004 and the national average 
Medicare Advantage rate in that year, updated 
to 2008.11
A rate that reflects a minimum increase from •	
the county’s 2004 payment level, updated to 
2008.12,13
A payment rate equal to 100 percent of esti-•	
mated county per capita fee-for-service costs in 
2004, updated to 2008.14
A payment rate equal to 100 percent of pro-•	
jected county per capita fee-for-service costs in 
2005, updated to 2008.15 
A payment rate equal to 100 percent of pro-•	
jected county per capita fee-for-service costs in 
2007, updated to 2008.16 
On average, county benchmarks exceed  
average fee-for-service costs in 2008 by 16.7 percent. 
Figure 1. Enrollment in Medicare Managed Care Plans 
as a Percentage of Total Medicare Beneficiaries, 1995–2008
Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services managed care enrollment data—
data for 1995–2002 are as of December 1 of each year; data for 2003–2007 are for the 
quarter ending in December of each year; data for 2008 are as of February 2008.
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Budget-Neutral Risk-Adjustment (BNRA) Policy. 
The BNRA policy, in effect since 2003, has increased 
MA plan payments across-the-board so that aggregate 
MA plan payments are less affected by the implemen-
tation of an improved risk-adjustment mechanism that 
adjusts benchmark rates to account for variation in 
enrollees’ health status and clinical conditions. The 
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 provided for a phase-
out of this increase in MA benchmark rates from 2006 
through 2010. In 2008, the BNRA policy increases all 
county benchmarks by 1.7 percent, adding approxi-
mately $1.3 billion to MA payments.17 
Payment for Indirect Medicare Education Included 
in the Benchmarks.  An explicit policy included in 
the MMA provides that the MA benchmark payment 
rate for each county includes an amount that reflects 
Medicare payments to teaching hospitals for their indi-
rect medical education (IME) costs. This sum is 
included in the MA county benchmarks, despite the 
fact that Medicare makes IME payments directly to 
teaching hospitals for MA enrollees admitted to these 
hospitals. Medicare therefore effectively pays twice for 
the IME costs of MA plan members.18 This double 
payment raises the MA benchmark rates by about 2.3 
percent, and MA payments by an estimated $1.7 bil-
lion. The recent MIPPA legislation removes this com-
ponent of MA payment rates beginning in 2010.
In an arrangement similar to the additional pay-
ments that teaching hospitals receive from Medicare 
for their IME costs, hospitals that treat a dispropor-
tionate share of indigent patients receive a dispropor-
tionate share hospital (DSH) payment for patients in 
traditional fee-for-service Medicare. Unlike IME pay-
ments, however, Medicare DSH payments are included 
in the monthly capitation payment rates that plans 
receive, but not made directly to hospitals; it is left to 
each plan to determine how much of the DSH amount, 
if any, it will pay to each institution. Medicare DSH 
payments are not in general related to the costs faced 
by individual plans, and an argument could be made 
that they, like IME payments, should be paid directly 
to eligible hospitals for the MA patients they treat. 
Because a good estimate is not available for the 
county-level effect of DSH payments on MA pay-
ments, they are not included in the calculations in this 
analysis. But they could be considered as representing 
additional overpayments to MA plans.
MA Plan Bidding System. Under the bidding mecha-
nism established by the MMA, all MA plans submit 
bids for the provision of traditional Medicare benefits 
to their enrollees. MA plans then receive payments 
equal to the applicable benchmark rate for the county 
in which each enrollee resides minus 25 percent of the 
difference between the county benchmark and each 
individual plan’s bid. Plan bids for 2008 were an aver-
age of 17 percent below their county benchmarks, 
according to Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
staff analysis.19 This implies that MA plan payments 
are, on average, 4.3 percent (25 percent of 17 percent) 
below their corresponding benchmarks; since the 
benchmarks themselves are 16.7 percent above fee-for-
service costs, on average, MA plan payments are 12.4 
percent (16.7 percent minus 4.3 percent) above fee-
for-service costs. 
Variation in Extra PaymEnts in 2008 
The overall pattern of Medicare extra payments to MA 
plans in 2008 may be described by focusing on plans 
located in three types of areas. 
“Large urban floor” counties.•	  The largest 
aggregate amount of extra payments goes to 
MA plans in the counties in which the large 
urban floor benchmark determines the MA pay-
ment rates. The extra payments received by MA 
plans in these counties amount to approximately 
$3.8 billion, or 44 percent of the $8.5 billion in 
total extra payments in 2008. Extra payments to 
plans in these counties are estimated to average 
$1,478 (or 20 percent) more per plan enrollee 
than the same person would be expected to cost 
under traditional Medicare fee-for-service.  
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“100 percent of fee-for-service” counties.•	  In the 
counties where MA payments are determined by 
the 100 percent of fee-for-service benchmark, 
total extra payments are estimated at over $2.6 
billion, accounting for 30.6 percent of total 
extra payments nationwide.
This seemingly anomalous finding—payments 
based on 100 percent of fee-for-service costs 
actually exceeding fee-for-service costs—is the 
result of the three policies described above, 
which actually overstate MA payments relative 
to patient care costs under traditional Medicare. 
First, the BNRA policy adds 1.7 percent to the 
MA benchmarks in every county in 2008. 
Second, the inclusion of the IME payment in 
the MA benchmarks adds 2.3 percent, on aver-
age, to those benchmarks. Third, because the 
MA rebasing policy sets new county bench-
marks only higher than, and never less than, a 
county’s previous year MA benchmark updated 
to the current year, many plans paid at 100 per-
cent of fee-for-service in an earlier year updated 
to 2008 are paid more than the current average 
of fee-for-service costs in the county in 2008. 
Rural counties•	 . Despite the initial concern over 
low MA payment rates in rural counties, it 
should be noted that MA extra payments do not 
flow disproportionately to Medicare plans in 
rural areas. While 17.9 percent of Medicare 
beneficiaries live in counties where MA pay-
ment rates are determined by the rural floor 
benchmark, only $1.1 billion (13 percent) of 
MA extra payments will go to plans in these 
counties in 2008. 
Thirty-five years of national experience with 
HMOs and managed care plans indicates that private 
managed care plans have generally located and 
attracted enrollees in urban areas. This pattern is 
evident both in commercial health insurance and 
Medicare. After 10 years of rural floor payments in 
excess of 100 percent of average fee-for-service costs, 
fewer than 11 percent of Medicare beneficiaries in 
rural counties are enrolled in MA plans in 2008, com-
pared with 24 percent of beneficiaries in urban counties. 
The distribution of MA extra payments and 
enrollees by payment category is displayed in 
Appendix Tables 1 and 2.
vARiATiOn in ExTRA PAyMEnTS  
By STATE in 2008 
The amount of extra payments to MA plans in 2008 
varies greatly by state (see Appendix Table 3). Extra 
payments per enrollee in 2008 range from a maximum 
of over $2,200 in New Mexico and Hawaii to a mini-
mum of just $228 in Nevada. Notably, the states with 
the greatest extra payments per MA enrollee are gener-
ally the ones with the lowest per capita fee-for-service 
costs. While New Mexico’s are 20 percent below the 
national average, Nevada’s are 6 percent above. 
However, although this relationship might appear 
to reduce the discrepancy between high- and low-cost 
states, it actually provides a perverse incentive for 
beneficiaries in states with low fee-for-service costs to 
leave traditional Medicare while failing to provide the 
same attractive alternative for beneficiaries in states 
with high fee-for-service costs. Plans in states where 
costs are already low thus are disproportionately 
rewarded by these extra payments, compared with plans 
in high-cost states—where more competition might be 
expected to bring those high costs down. 
Moreover, the total amount of extra payments to 
MA plans is highly concentrated among a relatively 
small number of states. In 2005, California and New 
York alone accounted for about one-fourth of total 
extra payments, and more than half went to plans in 
six states. By contrast, the 30 states with the lowest 
total extra payments together accounted for just 15 
percent of those payments.
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MA PlAn PAyMEnTS SinCE 2003 
MA payment rates were increased by the MMA begin-
ning in March 2004. Since that time, MA payment 
benchmarks—and Medicare payments generally—
have exceeded costs of fee-for-service Medicare for 
every plan in every county in the nation. The effect of 
these provisions has been to increase total extra pay-
ments from $3.9 billion in 2004 to $8.5 billion in 2008 
(Figure 2), with a cumulative five-year cost of nearly 
$33 billion. 
Total extra payments have increased both 
because of growth in the amount of extra payments per 
MA plan enrollee and growth in the total number of 
enrollees. Extra payments per enrollee were $795 (11.9 
percent) above fee-for-service costs in 2004, rising to a 
high of $1,037 (14.1 percent) above fee-for-service 
costs in 2006, and then hitting $986 (12.4 percent) 
above fee-for-service costs in 2008 (Figure 3). The 
peak in 2006 mainly reflects the level of BNRA pay-
ments at 7.7 percent in 2006, 3.9 percent in 2007, and 
1.7 percent in 2008. Meanwhile, the number of 
Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in MA plans has 
increased from 4.8 million to 8.6 million.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has 
attributed the increase in MA enrollment to the extra 
payments received by MA plans. In 2007, prior to the 
passage of MIPPA, CBO projected that a policy of 
paying MA plans at 100 percent of fee-for-service 
costs at the county level—that is, of eliminating the 
extra payments—would reduce projected MA enroll-
ment in 2012 from 12.5 million to 6.2 million 
Medicare beneficiaries, a number only slightly higher 
than MA enrollment in 2005.20 CBO also estimated 
that the resulting reduction in Medicare spending 
would total $54 billion over the four years from 2009 
through 2012 and $149 billion over the nine years 
from 2009 through 2017 (Figure 4). 
Figure 2. Trends in Total Extra Payments 
to MA Plans, 2004–2008
Source: GWU analysis of CMS Medicare Advantage enrollment and payment rate data for 
2004-2006 and MedPAC analysis of MA plan bids for 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
Year
To
ta
l A
nn
ua
l E
xtr
a P
ay
m
en
ts
 
to
 M
A 
Pl
an
s (
in
 B
ill
io
ns
)
$12
$10
$8
$6
$4
$2
$0
$3.9
$5.2
$7.2 $7.9
$8.5
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Source: Congressional Budget Office, June 2007.
Year
To
ta
l S
av
in
gs
 (i
n B
ill
io
ns
)
Figure 4. Estimated Savings from the Implementation of a 
Policy to Reduce Payments to MA Plans to 
100 Percent of Fee-for-Service Costs, 2009–2017
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Figure 3. Trends in Average Extra Payment per MA Plan 
Enrollee, 2004–2008
Source: GWU analysis of CMS Medicare Advantage enrollment and payment rate data 
for 2004-2006 and MedPAC analysis of MA plan bids for 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
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COnCluSiOn
The MMA-driven policies that raised Medicare payments 
to private plans have spurred greater enrollment in 
those plans, but have substantially increased Medicare 
costs. This is primarily due to extra payments—payments 
in excess of fee-for-service costs—paid to private 
plans by Medicare. In 2008, for each of the 8.6 million 
Medicare enrollees in managed care, Medicare will 
spend an average of $986, or 12.4 percent, more than 
it would for comparable beneficiaries in traditional 
fee-for-service Medicare, with total extra payments to 
MA plans exceeding $8.5 billion. 
There is wide variation in these extra pay-
ments across geographic areas: the average amount per 
MA enrollee by state ranges from $228 (2.6 percent 
above average fee-for-service costs) in Nevada to 
$2,305 (35 percent above average fee-for-service 
costs) in New Mexico. This variation indicates that the 
availability of additional benefits—which was a major 
objective of the policy changes in the MMA—is con-
centrated in some regions while remaining absent from 
others. Moreover, the impact of these extra payments 
on beneficiaries in many areas is questionable. For 
example, counties where the rural floor applies contain 
17.9 percent of total Medicare beneficiaries, but they 
receive only 13 percent of extra payments because the 
vast majority of their beneficiaries—87.4 percent—
remain in traditional Medicare. 
Extra payments to MA private plans have 
increased Medicare costs by nearly $33 billion in the 
five years since 2004. Prior to the enactment of 
MIPPA in July 2008, MA extra payments were pro-
jected to add almost $150 billion to Medicare costs 
over the next nine years. Moreover, overpayment of 
private plans presents a threat to Medicare’s effi-
ciency—contravening the original reason for including 
a private plan option in Medicare. 
These extra payments, which represent a drain 
on the federal budget, could otherwise be used to 
reduce the nation’s deficit or to offset the costs of 
Medicare policy improvements. The latter could 
involve, say, reducing Part B premiums, increasing eli-
gibility for low-income subsidies in Medicare Part D, 
or reducing Part D copayments. All of these alterna-
tives represent broader or better-targeted benefits for 
the Medicare dollars spent. 
While MIPPA reduced the extra payments to 
private plans, a substantial amount of those extra pay-
ments remain. The substantial cost of those extra pay-
ments, along with the potential distortion of incentives 
in a program intended to improve efficiency, and the 
large number of pressing needs to which those resources 
might alternatively be applied all suggest that current 
Medicare policies deserve continued examination.
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Appendix Table 1. Extra Payments in 2008, by County Payment Category, 
to Medicare Advantage Plans Relative to Average Fee-for-Service Costs1
Average Extra Payment for MA Plans2,3,7
County 
Payment Type
Medicare 
Beneficiaries5
MA Plan 
Enrollees4
Total Annual 
Extra Payments 
to MA Plans 
(millions)
Average Extra 
Amount per MA 
Plan Enrollee
Average Extra Payment 
to MA Plans Greater 
than FFS Costs 
National 42,986,173 8,666,615 $8,541 $986 12.4%
Rural Floor 7,677,075 968,106 1,114 1,151 16.4%
Urban Floor 11,346,652 2,572,212 3,802 1,478 20.0%
Blend 1,404,844 343,146 416 1,214 14.8%
Minimum Update 2,495,260 598,826 588 983 10.8%
100% FFS 20046 3,246,396 578,946 728 1,257 14.1%
100% FFS 20056 14,037,766 2,958,146 1,788 604 6.7%
100% FFS 20076 2,778,180 647,233 106 164 1.6%
1 Calculations exclude payments to teaching hospitals for the IME expenses both of MA and fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries. Calculations include budget-neutral 
risk adjustment of 1.0169.
2 Calculations at the county level, weighted by MA enrollment. Excludes MA enrollees in cost plans.
3 In 2006 and future years, the MMA provides that payments to MA plans change from a system based entirely on county benchmarks to one that combines county benchmarks 
with a bid by each individual MA plan. The new benchmark-based bidding system allocates 75% of the difference between the county benchmark and the MA plan bid to the plan 
and 25% to the federal government. Analysts at MedPAC who have studied Medicare private-plan payments and costs have found that the average MA plan bid is approximately 
17% less than the county benchmark. This would result in a 4.25% reduction in benchmark extra payment rates to MA plans. The above calculations account for the fact that 
average MA plan bids fall 17% below the 2007 MA benchmark rates. See: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, “Special Needs Plans and an Update on the Medicare 
Advantage Program,” MedPAC Public Meeting, Dec. 6, 2007 (Washington, D.C.: MedPAC, 2007).
4 Medicare Advantage enrollment data as of February 2008.
5 Medicare beneficiary totals as of December 2005.
6 CMS decided to rebase the 100% of FFS rate at the county level in 2005 and 2007. Rebasing the FFS rates means that CMS retabulated the per capita FFS expenditures 
for each county so that the FFS rates reflected more recent county growth trends in FFS expenditures. The MMA provided that the county-level payment rate for MA plans in 
2005 be the higher of the 2005 rebased 100% of FFS rate or the 2004 rate increased by 6.6%. See: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, “Note to Medicare Advantage 
Organizations and Other Interested Parties: Advance Notice of Methodological Changes for Calendar Year (CY) 2005 Medicare Advantage Payment Rates” (Washington, D.C.: 
CMS, Mar. 26, 2004), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Advance2005.pdf, accessed Sept. 15, 2004.
For 2007, the county-level payment rate for MA plans was the higher of the 2007 rebased 100% of FFS rate or the 2006 rate increased by 7.1%. See: Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services, “Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2007 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies Fact Sheet” 
(Washington, D.C.: CMS, Apr. 3, 2006), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/factsheet2007.pdf, accessed May 30, 2006.
7 For these calculations, 2007 FFS rates have been adjusted by 5.71% in accordance with the updated national estimates for 2008 on per capita MA growth percentage, released 
by CMS on April 2, 2007. See: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, “Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2008 Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates and 
Payment Policies” (Washington, D.C.: CMS, Apr. 2, 2007), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Announcement2008.pdf.
Note: Calculations exclude Medicare beneficiaries and MA enrollees in Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Source: George Washington University analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Medicare Managed Care State/County/Contract Data File, released February 
2008; Medicare Managed Care Quarterly State, County Data File for the quarter ending December 2005; and the Medicare Advantage 2008 Rate Calculation Data Spreadsheet.
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Appendix Table 2. 2008 Distributions, by County Payment Category, of Medicare Beneficiaries, 
Medicare Advantage Plan Enrollees, MA Enrollment Rates, and Extra Payments to MA Plans 
County 
Payment Type
Distribution 
of Medicare 
Beneficiaries
Distribution 
of MA Plan 
Enrollees
MA Plan 
Enrollment Rate
Distribution 
of MA Plan 
Extra Payments
National 100.0% 100.0% 20.2% 100.0%
Rural Floor 17.9% 11.2% 12.6% 13.0%
Urban Floor 26.4% 29.7% 22.7% 44.5%
Blend 3.3% 4.0% 24.4% 4.9%
Minimum Update 5.8% 6.9% 24.2% 6.9%
100% FFS 20041 7.6% 6.7% 17.8% 8.5%
100% FFS 20051 32.7% 34.1% 21.1% 20.9%
100% FFS 20071 6.5% 7.5% 23.3% 1.2%
1 CMS decided to rebase the 100 percent of FFS rate at the county level in 2005 and 2007. Rebasing the FFS rates means that CMS retabulated the per capita FFS expenditures 
for each county so that the FFS rates reflected more recent county growth trends in FFS expenditures. The MMA provided that the county-level payment rate for MA plans in 
2005 be the higher of the 2005 rebased 100% of FFS rate or the 2004 rate increased by 6.6%. See: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, “Note to Medicare Advantage 
Organizations and Other Interested Parties: Advance Notice of Methodological Changes for Calendar Year (CY) 2005 Medicare Advantage Payment Rates” (Washington, D.C.: 
CMS, Mar. 26, 2004), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Advance2005.pdf, accessed Sept. 15, 2004. 
For 2007, the county level payment rate for MA plans was the higher of the 2007 rebased 100% of FFS rate or the 2006 rate increased by 7.1%. See: Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services, “Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2007 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies Fact Sheet” 
(Washington, D.C.: CMS, Apr. 3, 2006), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/factsheet2007.pdf, accessed May 30, 2006.
Source: George Washington University analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Medicare Managed Care State/County/Contract data file released February 2008; 
Medicare Managed Care Quarterly State, County Data File for the quarter ending December 2005; and the Medicare Advantage 2008 Rate Calculation Data Spreadsheet.
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Appendix Table 3. Extra Payments to Medicare Advantage Plans in 2008 Compared 
with Average Fee-for-Service Costs, by State1
Average MA Plan Payment 
Greater than FFS Costs2,3,6
State
Medicare 
Beneficiaries5
MA Plan 
Enrollees4
MA Plan 
Enrollment 
Rate
Average 
Extra 
Amount 
per 
MA Plan 
Enrollee
Total Extra 
Payments 
to MA Plans 
(millions)
Average Extra 
Payment to MA 
Plans Greater 
than FFS Costs 
National 42,986,173 8,666,615 20.2% $986 $8,541 12.4%
Rural 12,692,302 1,399,716 11.0% 889 1,244 12.3%
Urban 30,293,871 7,266,899 24.0% 1,004 7,297 12.5%
Alabama 781,601 126,308 16.2% 841 106 10.1%
Alaska 45,701 88 0.2% 715 0.1 8.3%
Arizona 818,639 300,985 36.8% 1,090 328 13.8%
Arkansas 489,388 53,296 10.9% 1,017 54 13.7%
California 4,386,037 1,458,679 33.3% 902 1,315 10.8%
Colorado 542,294 153,331 28.3% 891 137 11.1%
Connecticut 540,699 67,423 12.5% 459 31 5.3%
Delaware 132,269 4,106 3.1% 596 2 7.1%
D.C. 77,597 2,034 2.6% 1,466 3 16.1%
Florida 3,129,832 819,793 26.2% 279 229 3.4%
Georgia 1,076,986 128,138 11.9% 1,096 140 14.1%
Hawaii 189,271 31,247 16.5% 2,265 71 34.1%
Idaho 198,714 45,573 22.9% 1,289 59 17.5%
Illinois 1,749,064 143,742 8.2% 721 104 9.3%
Indiana 934,910 91,109 9.7% 1,290 118 17.4%
Iowa 502,547 46,763 9.3% 1,548 72 22.7%
Kansas 412,026 30,900 7.5% 993 31 12.4%
Kentucky 704,727 82,838 11.8% 917 76 11.9%
Louisiana 642,618 123,277 19.2% 1,275 157 12.9%
Maine 243,190 10,499 4.3% 1,540 16 21.7%
Maryland 718,389 30,002 4.2% 398 12 4.2%
Massachusetts 1,007,212 180,488 17.9% 877 158 9.9%
Michigan 1,537,840 311,878 20.3% 763 238 9.6%
Minnesota 721,521 161,166 22.3% 814 131 10.9%
Mississippi 471,940 33,977 7.2% 919 31 11.1%
Missouri 942,794 162,321 17.2% 1,059 172 13.5%
Montana 153,286 20,596 13.4% 966 20 13.4%
Nebraska 267,836 24,611 9.2% 950 23 12.4%
Nevada 308,802 97,351 31.5% 228 22 2.6%
New Hampshire 194,363 6,851 3.5% 1,105 8 14.1%
New Jersey 1,270,110 119,500 9.4% 361 43 3.9%
New Mexico 277,591 62,588 22.5% 2,305 144 35.0%
New York 2,879,429 726,156 25.2% 1,123 816 14.0%
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Average MA Plan Payment 
Greater than FFS Costs2,3,6
State
Medicare 
Beneficiaries5
MA Plan 
Enrollees4
MA Plan 
Enrollment 
Rate
Average 
Extra 
Amount 
per 
MA Plan 
Enrollee
Total Extra 
Payments 
to MA Plans 
(millions)
Average Extra 
Payment to MA 
Plans Greater 
than FFS Costs 
North Carolina 1,318,782 206,710 15.7% 1,510 312 20.6%
North Dakota 106,313 5,902 5.6% 1,184 7 16.9%
Ohio 1,811,669 419,685 23.2% 1,084 455 13.8%
Oklahoma 559,862 71,050 12.7% 691 49 8.1%
Oregon 557,661 221,939 39.8% 1,708 379 25.3%
Pennsylvania 2,189,492 735,739 33.6% 831 612 10.1%
Rhode Island 177,579 62,121 35.0% 1,449 90 18.9%
South Carolina 673,878 82,596 12.3% 1,065 88 13.8%
South Dakota 128,623 10,122 7.9% 1,207 12 17.5%
Tennessee 955,071 186,123 19.5% 1,031 192 13.3%
Texas 2,641,789 409,991 15.5% 1,482 607 15.7%
Utah 245,106 62,275 25.4% 1,416 88 19.1%
Vermont 100,351 2,189 2.2% 1,167 3 16.5%
Virginia 1,023,393 98,115 9.6% 1,628 160 23.0%
Washington 851,609 184,789 21.7% 1,477 273 20.0%
West Virginia 367,440 64,604 17.6% 1,045 68 14.0%
Wisconsin 854,772 182,931 21.4% 1,520 278 21.7%
Wyoming 73,560 2,120 2.9% 649 1 8.7%
1 Calculations exclude payments to teaching hospitals for the IME expenses both of MA and FFS beneficiaries.
2 Calculations at the county level, weighted by MA enrollment. Excludes MA enrollees in cost plans. Calculations include budget neutral risk adjustment of 1.0169.
3 In 2006 and future years, the MMA provides that payments to MA plans change from a system based entirely on county benchmarks to one that combines county benchmarks 
with a bid by each individual MA plan. The new benchmark-based bidding system allocates 75% of the difference between the county benchmark and the MA plan bid to the plan 
and 25% to the federal government. Analysts at MedPAC who have studied Medicare private-plan payments and costs have found that the average MA plan bid is approximately 
17% less than the county benchmark. This would result in a 4.25% reduction in benchmark extra payment rates to MA plans. The above calculations account for the fact that 
average MA plan bids fall 17% below the 2007 MA benchmark rates. See: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, “Special Needs Plans and an Update on the Medicare 
Advantage Program,” MedPAC Public Meeting, Dec. 6, 2007 (Washington, D.C.: MedPAC, 2007).
4 Medicare Advantage enrollment data as of February 2008.
5 Medicare beneficiary totals as of December 2005.
6 For these calculations, 2007 FFS rates have been adjusted by 5.71% in accordance with the updated national estimates for 2008 on per capita MA growth percentage estimates 
for 2008, released by CMS on April 2, 2007. See: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, “Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2008 Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation 
Rates and Payment Policies” (Washington, D.C.: CMS, Apr. 2, 2007), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Announcement2008.pdf.
Source: George Washington University analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Medicare Managed Care State/County/Contract Data File released February 
2008; Medicare Managed Care Quarterly State, County Data File for the quarter ending December 2005; and the Medicare Advantage 2008 Rate Calculation Data Spreadsheet.
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study methods
This report’s 2008 analysis is based on Medicare Advantage payment rates and fee-for-service expenditure aver-
ages posted by county in the 2008 CMS Medicare Advantage Rate Calculation Data spreadsheet.i The number 
of Medicare Advantage enrollees by county is taken from the CMS State/County/Contract data file for February 
2008. The number of Medicare beneficiaries by county is taken from the Medicare Managed Care Quarterly 
State County data file for the quarter ending December 2005. These data are posted on the Website of the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, http://www.cms.hhs.gov.ii 
The county is the basic unit of analysis, as Medicare sets MA plan payment rates at the county level. For 2008, 
Medicare benchmark rates for MA plans in each county are set at the highest of seven different reference points: 
a floor rate for counties in large urban areas; a floor rate for other counties; a blended rate (consisting of 50 per-
cent of the county-specific base MA payment rate and 50 percent of the national average base MA payment 
rate); a minimum update over the previous year’s payment rate; a payment rate equal to 100 percent of per cap-
ita fee-for-service costs in the county in 2004, trended forward to 2008; a payment rate equal to 100 percent of 
per capita fee-for-service costs in the county in 2005, trended forward to 2008; or a payment rate equal to 100 
percent of per capita fee-for-service costs in the county in 2007, trended forward to 2008. The MMA provides 
for the annual minimum increase in MA plan payments to be the higher of: 1) the Medicare national growth-rate 
percentage in fee-for-service expenditures; or 2) 2 percent. Given that the projected national growth rate for 
2008 was 5.71 percent, payments in all counties were thus increased by at least that amount. 
Extra payments to Medicare Advantage plans are calculated for each of the more than 3,000 counties in the 
United States in 2008. Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands are not included in the analysis. All calcula-
tions are MA plan enrollee-weighted to reflect variations in enrollment and payment rates. 
Over 300,000 MA enrollees are in Medicare “cost” plans, paid on the basis of costs. Although these beneficia-
ries (identified through the CMS Medicare Advantage State/County/Contract data file for February 2008) 
receive Medicare benefits through managed care plans, they do not generate extra payments based on MA plan 
payment rates.iii Cost beneficiaries were removed from the Medicare Advantage enrollee totals by county but are 
included in the number of overall Medicare beneficiaries. 
This analysis follows a methodological convention developed by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
(MedPAC) in addressing the Medicare policy of making direct payments to teaching hospitals for the costs of 
indirect medical education (IME) for MA enrollees. MedPAC adjusts fee-for-service costs at the county level by 
removing the average IME expense. This is done by deflating the county fee-for-service average by a factor of 
1–(0.65 x GME), where GME is the county graduate medical education carve-out and 0.65 represents the 
national average percentage of GME payments that goes to IME; county-specific data are unavailable. Because 
Medicare makes IME payments directly to teaching hospitals for patients who are enrolled in Medicare Advantage, 
MA plan payment rates are most appropriately compared with fee-for-service costs adjusted in this manner.iv
Budget-neutral risk adjustments to 2008 payments to Medicare Advantage plans provide additional extra payments 
to MA plans. This analysis of extra payments includes a budget-neutral risk adjustment of 1.0169 for 2008.v
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Notes to Study Methods
i Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Rate Calculation Data Risk 2008 spreadsheet (Baltimore, Md.: CMS, 
Apr. 2007), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/.
ii Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Advantage State/County/Contract Data (Baltimore, Md.: CMS, 
Feb. 2008), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/; Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services, Medicare Managed Care Quarterly State County Data (Baltimore, Md.: CMS, Dec. 2005), available at http://
www.cms.hhs.gov/HealthPlanRepFileData/.
iii Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicare Advantage State/County/Contract Data (Baltimore, Md.: CMS, 
Feb. 2008), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/.
iv Alternatively, indirect medical education amounts may be added to Medicare Advantage payment rates, and these 
adjusted rates are directly compared with published fee-for-service spending averages. The two methods have extremely 
similar results.
v Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, “Note to: All Medicare Advantage Organizations and Other Interested 
Parties: Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2008 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and Payment Policies” 
(Baltimore, Md.: CMS, Apr. 2007), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/.
Note: This brief’s analysis for the years 2004–2007 utilizes the same methods described above. Enrollment and 
beneficiary totals are from December of each year.
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